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I.Introduction 
A significant volume of literature has evolved in recent years that examine the impact of monetary 
policy. At the macroeconomic level, these studies employ time series techniques to identify the 
effect of monetary shock on output and inflation (Gertler and Karadi, 2014). At the microeconomic 
level, researchers have utilized longitudinal data and focused on the impact of monetary policy on 
banks (Altunbas et al., 2014), firms (Mizen and Yalcin, 2006) and more broadly, on financial markets 
(Gali and Gambetti, 2014). A common thread permeating these studies is that monetary policy 
exerts a non-negligible impact on both real and financial variables.  
However, one area that has largely escaped the attention of researchers is the impact of monetary 
policy on informal finance. To the extent that monetary policy influences the cost of funds in the 
formal financial sector, it appears likely that its influence would also reverberate to the informal 
financial sector. Whether any such impact manifests itself in emerging economies has not been 
systematically explored in prior empirical research. 
Towards this end, we employ decadal data on major Indian states during 1961-2011 to examine the 
impact of monetary policy on informal finance. Combining information on the proportion of 
households accessing finance from various non-institutional sources with indicators on economic, 
financial and social variables, we identify a non-linear impact of monetary policy on informal finance.  
Economically, it is possible to discern several channels through which monetary policy can affect 
informal finance. First, the broad credit channel argues that if the share of small-scale manufacturing 
is high, the more likely would be the efficacy of monetary policy owing to information asymmetries 
that plague small firms. A strict creditworthiness criterion adopted during monetary contraction 
could alienate prospective informal sector borrowers with inadequate collateral backing, 
necessitating higher dependence on informal finance. Second, the financial inclusion channel. 
Provided the outreach of formal finance is high, the less likely the need to take recourse to informal 
finance. This is because the cost of formal finance is typically much lower as compared to the cost of 
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informal finance, even after taking on board the rise in the cost of formal finance consequent upon a 
monetary contraction (World Bank, 2009). Third, the human capital channel. A more literate 
population implies greater awareness about the possible pitfalls of greater dependence on informal 
finance, lowering the dependence on such finance. And finally, the uncertainty channel. Greater 
uncertainty (e.g., due to inflation volatility) would engender higher precautionary demand for cash, 
especially if inflationary expectations are not well-anchored. In such a situation, a contractionary 
monetary policy further exacerbates the uncertainty, and more so for informal sector borrowers 
with uneven cash flows, further increasing the dependence on informal finance. We construct 
proxies for each of these channels and understand their impact on informal finance.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides an overview of the admittedly limited 
literature in this field. The subsequent section describes the data and empirical strategy. The results 
are discussed in Section IV. The final section concludes and raises certain policy concerns.     
 
II. Literature 
The extant literature of the impact of monetary policy on the informal financial sector is limited. 
Theoretical contributions have explored the relationship between the informal and formal credit 
markets. Within a game theoretic setup, Gupta and Chaudhuri (1997) analyze the interplay between 
formal and informal credit markets and finds that a market for informal credit exists either because 
the supply of formal finance is inadequate or because it is not available when needed most. 
Madestam (2009) extends the analysis by assuming two types of informal lenders – those who lend 
from their own equity and those who access formal finance - in order to onlend to informal sector. 
They find that additional informal finance increases the investment of bank-rationed borrowers by 
channeling bank funds into informal lending.  
Several studies examine this issue within an empirical setup. In an early attempt, Carpenter (1999) 
focuses on the relationship between informal lending and monetary policy. Utilizing a Vector 
Autoregression framework for South Korea, the analysis uncovers evidence that directed credit 
extended by the central bank (a proxy for monetary policy) exerts a significant effect on the interest 
rate in the informal sector. 
Subsequent research has expanded on this framework using sophisticated techniques. By way of 
example, using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model, Ngalawa and VIegi (2013) 
find that interest rates in the formal and informal financial sectors tend to move in opposite 
directions, following a monetary shock. More recently, employing survey data for a leading Chinese 
city with a significant informal sector presence, Qin et al (2014) suggests that informal lending rates 
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exhibit a significant response to national monetary policy.  A possible implication of these studies is 
that the relation between monetary policy and informal finance is not unambiguous.  
In the Indian case, several studies have investigated the link between formal and informal finance. 
Early studies (Acharya and Madhur, 1983; Sundaram and Pandit, 1984) explored the interlinkage 
between commercial bank credit and informal interest rate. The major concern of these studies was 
whether the black money in the economy impedes the monetary transmission process. Subsequent 
research employs data from All-India Debt and Investment Survey (AIDIS) and documents that the 
increase in the penetration of formal finance during 1961-81 was modest, at best (Basu, 2005). 
Recent empirical research suggests that the interest cost in informal credit markets are much more 
favorable for rich borrowers who have better bargaining power (Bhattacharjee and Rajeev, 2010).  
The fact that informal financing plays a significant role in shaping household consumption is 
evidenced from the recent AIDIS (Government of India, 2014). The data indicates that the share of 
informal financing sources in 2012 was close to half of total households borrowings as compared to 
43% in 2002. A disaggregated analysis reveals a compositional shift with the recent increase being 
driven by a rise in the share of credit from relatives and money lenders, whereas the share of 
landlords declined (Table 1).  
  Table 1: Share of informal financing sources (per cent) 
 1961 1971 1981 1991 2002 2012 
Landlords 0.9 8.6 4.1 4.0 1.0 0.8 
Moneylenders 60.8 36.9 16.9 15.7 29.6 28.6 
Traders & commission agents 7.7 8.7 3.6 7.1 2.6 0.2 
Relatives and friends 6.9 13.8 9.3 6.7 7.1 16.2 
Others 8.9 2.8 4.9 2.5 2.6 2.4 
Total non-institutional 85.2 70.8 38.8 36.0 42.9 48.1 
 Source: AIDIS (various years) 
 
The contribution of this paper is three-fold. First, notwithstanding the penetration of formal finance, 
the proportion of households’ with borrowings from informal sources in India has not declined 
substantially since the 1980s (Mohan, 2005). Indeed, as the recently released AIDIS (Government of 
India, 2014) would suggest, the proportion of informal (or, non-institutional) finance has actually 
increased, after witnessing a dip during 1981-1991. Whether monetary policy plays a role in 
influencing this process is one of the major concerns of the paper. Second, borrowing from the 
literature on regional economies in India, we identify several channels through which monetary 
policy influences informal finance by constructing proxies for those channels. Third, India is one of 
the very few economies for whom reliable time-series information on informal financial sector at the 
state-level is available. The longitudinal nature of this database makes it amenable to rigorous 
empirical research.  
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III. Database and empirical strategy 
Database 
We construct a dataset of the relevant variables for 14 major states, including observations every 
ten years such as 1961-62, 1971-72, 1981-82, 1991-92 and 2001-02 and 2011-12.2 The benefit of 
employing decadal data is two-fold. First, it enables to understand the impact of monetary policy on 
the informal financial sector over an elongated time span wherein the various forces shaping its 
evolution are likely to have played themselves out. Second, consistent data on several state-level 
variables, particularly for informal finance, is available only at decadal intervals.  
We rely on several data sources. The major data source is the All India Debt and Investment Surveys 
(AIDIS). A crucial feature of the AIDIS is data on household debt by credit agency (formal and 
informal). According to the AIDIS, the agency from which a loan is taken treated as the credit agency. 
The credit agencies are either institutional or non-institutional (or, informal) in nature. The former 
includes government, banks, insurance, provident fund and financial corporations. More pertinent 
for our purpose is the latter which includes landlords, money lenders, trader, relatives and a residual 
catch-all category, labeled ‘others’. From this database, we cull out information on the proportion of 
household indebted to various non-institutional sources, as indicated earlier.  
Besides, we also employ several other data sources, such as the EPW States database (for data on 
sectoral shares and net state domestic product, NSDP), Handbook of State Finances of the Reserve 
Bank of India, Basic Statistical Returns (which provides state-level information on credit), Economic 
Survey and the Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy (HBS) of the Reserve Bank of India, which 
provides information on the monetary policy rate (Table 2).3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 These states are: Andhra Pradesh (AP), Karnataka (KAR), Kerala (KER) and Tamil Nadu (TN) in Southern region, 
Haryana (HAR), Punjab (PUN), Rajasthan (RAJ) and Uttar Pradesh (UP) in the Northern region, Bihar (BH), Odisha (ORS), 
and West Bengal (WB) in the Eastern region and Gujarat (GUJ) Maharashtra (MAH) and Madhya Pradesh (MP) in the 
Western region.  
3
 Data on policy rate for the years prior to 1992 is culled from the Chartbook on Financial and Economic Indicators (CFE) 
of the Reserve Bank of India (1978).   
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Table 2: Variable definition and summary statistics 
Variable Definition Data source 
Total Informal finance/Total (formal+informal) finance AIDIS, various years 
Landlords Informal finance by landlords/Informal finance (IF) AIDIS, various years 
Moneylenders Informal finance by moneylenders/ IF AIDIS, various years 
Traders Informal finance by traders/ IF AIDIS, various years 
Relatives informal finance by relatives etc/ IF AIDIS, various years 
Others Informal finance by others /IF AIDIS, various years 
MYP Policy rate, proxied by the Repo Rate Handbook of Statistics/ Chartbook of 
Financial Indicators 
Sh_unreg Unregistered manufacturing/ NSDP  EPW Research Foundation (EPWRF)/ RBI 
Credit/NSDP Bank credit/ NSDP Numerator is from RBI 
Bank office Bank office/100,000 Numerator is from RBI. Denominator is 
from EPWRF 
Volatility Decadal standard deviation of state-wise GDP 
deflator (proxy for uncertainty)     
EPWRF/ RBI 
Government Government expenditure/NSDP RBI State finance database 
Literacy Ln (state-level literacy) Economic Survey 
GDPGR Growth in per capita state income EPWRF/ RBI 
Coastal Dummy=1 if a state is coastal, else zero Wikipedia 
Merger Unity for the bifurcated states in 2001, else zero Wikipedia 
 
 
Empirical Strategy 
To examine the impact of monetary policy on informal finance, we run regressions of the following 
form: 
tststststots MergerDXMYPy ,,,,1, ')(                                                                                                                                        
(1) 
where s indexes state, t indexes year. In (1), the dependent variable is the proportion of households 
dependent on informal finance (and its sub-components). The coefficient of interest is α1, signifying 
the impact of monetary policy on informal finance.  
X is a vector of state-specific variables, such as the sectoral share of unregistered manufacturing 
(proxy for the broad credit channel), credit-to-NSDP ratio (proxy for financial penetration), bank 
offices per lac of population (proxy for financial inclusion), government expense to NSDP (a control 
for government size), standard deviation of state-level domestic product deflator (as a proxy for 
uncertainty) and finally, natural logarithm of literacy (proxy for human capital); ε is the error term. 
Akin to Gallup et al. (1999), we include a dummy variable (D) which equals one if the state is coastal, 
else zero to capture possible interlinkages between geography and informal finance.  
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Table 3: Impact of monetary policy on informal finance 
 Total 
 (1) (2) 
MYP -2.9***  
(0.93) 
49.5**  
(23.5) 
Sq. MYP  -340.8**   
(150.1) 
Controls Yes Yes 
Coastal -0.04  
(0.05) 
-0.02 (0.05) 
GDPGR YES YES 
Merger YES YES 
Obs. 69 69 
R-squared 0.39 0.48 
Standard errors (clustered by state) within parentheses 
***p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10 
 
Baseline Results  
The regression results are set out in Table 3. We first briefly discuss the control variables (not reported 
for brevity). When significant, the coefficient on Sh_Unreg is positive, which supports the existence of a 
broad credit channel. Uncertainty is a key factor impacting reliance on informal finance: in column 1, an 
increase in uncertainty by 1% increases overall reliance on the informal sector by roughly 1.6% points. 
This supports the existence of an uncertainty channel. Across sub-categories, it is observed that an 
increase in uncertainty raises the dependence on moneylenders and relatives, although the reliance on 
traders declines. This could arise because traders are agents who typically provide goods (e.g., food 
grains) on loans and during periods of uncertainty, it is liquid assets (e.g., cash) that are more in demand 
by households. Higher literacy is observed to lower dependence on informal finance, consistent with 
prior research (Bhattacharjee and Rajeev, 2010) and supporting the existence of a human capital 
channel. Contrary to established thinking, greater financial inclusion could end up raising the 
dependence on landlords. This can happen because households have limited collateral. During periods 
of exigencies, accessing bank loans, which comes with manifold documentary requirements, can prove 
challenging and impels them to take recourse to landlords.     
Our coefficient of interest is MYP. In column 1, the point estimate on MYP equals -2.9 and is statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level. The magnitudes are economically significant, as well. One possible way to 
interpret these findings would be to suggest that although a monetary contraction raises the cost of 
formal finance, given the formal-informal interlinkage (Bell, 1990; Kochhar, 1997; Pradhan, 2013), this 
also leads to a concomitant increase the cost of loans in the informal sector. The net effect is a 
reduction in borrowings from the informal sector.  
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In column 2, we include the squared term of MYP to explore possible non-linearities. The point 
estimates indicate that the coefficient on MYP is positive, while the squared term is negative. Both of 
them are statistically significant. In other words, a monetary contraction initially increases informal 
sector borrowings, but beyond a threshold, overall borrowings decline, presumably because the costs 
(e.g., conditions and terms of repayment) overwhelm the immediate benefits (e.g., medical and family 
emergencies).  
To test possible non-linear effects, we implement the approach of Lind and Mehlum (2009). Table 4 
shows that the marginal effect of monetary policy on informal borrowings is positive and statistically 
significant at MYPmin and negative and statistically significant at MYPmax. The bottom panel shows that 
the SLM test rejects the null hypothesis and therefore, our results are consistent with the presence of 
an inverted U shaped.   
 
Table 4: Lind Mehlum test of non-linearity 
 Total 
Slope at MYPmin 22.196 
Slope at MYPmax -18..695 
SLM test for inverse U shape 1.92 
p-Value 0.03 
Extremum point 0.072 
95% confidence interval (Fieller method) [-0.043, 0.076] 
 
We also consider which components of informal finance are influenced by a monetary contraction 
(not reported for brevity). The results suggest that it is basically borrowing from moneylenders that 
drive the results. Borrowing from landlords and from relatives initially declines in response to a 
monetary contraction and increases thereafter. This suggests a possible substitution effect among 
informal financing sources in that a monetary contraction initially raises borrowing from 
moneylenders, but as the costs become prohibitive, households switch to alternate sources, such as 
landlords and relatives.  
 
Is there a pecking order? 
Advancing this argument further, we estimate a regression specification using the same set of 
independent variables, as earlier. The dependent variable is a dummy which equals one if for any 
state in a given year, the proportion of households borrowing from landlords exceeds those 
borrowing from relatives, else zero. Consequently, if a monetary contraction lowers the relative 
dependence on borrowings from landlords, the coefficient would be negative.  
The results in Table 5 suggest that this is indeed the case. More specifically, a monetary contraction 
lowers the dependence on borrowings from landlords to a much greater extent as compared to that 
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from relatives. The effect is quantitatively important as well: in the fully augmented model (column 
3), a monetary contraction lowers household dependence on borrowing from landlords by roughly 
7% points, on average. This lends credence to our conjecture that there is a hierarchy in terms of 
dependence on informal finance by households.  
 
Table 5: Regression results of relative dependence on borrowing from landlords 
 (1) (2) (3) 
MYP -5.512**  
(2.497) 
-6.557**  
(2.686) 
-7.397*** 
(2.418) 
Controls No Partial All 
Coastal Yes Yes Yes 
GDPGR YES YES YES 
Merger YES YES YES 
N.Obs 69 69 69 
R-squared 0.25 0.29 0.39 
Standard errors (clustered by state) within parentheses 
***P<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10 
 
IV. Concluding remarks 
Employing longitudinal data for Indian states, we examine the impact of monetary policy on informal 
finance. The analysis appears to suggest a possible substitution effect in that, after an initial 
increase, borrowing from moneylenders decline at the expense of alternatives such as landlords and 
relatives. Investigating possible hierarchy among the preferred choices suggests that beyond a 
threshold, borrowing from relatives tends to be the preferred option.  
More often than not, monetary policy focuses on the formal financial sector and tends to short-shrift 
the informal credit market where availability of timely and cost effective credit remains a challenge. 
And importantly, the literature treats informal finance as a “catch-all” category with no particular 
preference for borrowings by households. Our analysis suggests that there is a significant and non-
negligible impact of monetary policy on the informal financial sector as well as a well-defined 
pecking order by which indebted households meet their borrowing requirements. With financial 
inclusion emerging as a major plank of inclusive growth going forward, this suggests a monetary 
policy needs to take on board this hitherto neglected segment. 
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